


Approved For Release 2003/06/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100100003-0

25X1




## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending 15 November 1969*

NSA review completed

Approved For Release 2003/06/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R000100100003-0

*Top Secret*



95739 11-69 CIA

Enemy Initiated Incidents

Enemy initiated action during the week ending 15 November decreased slightly from the notable high level of the previous week. The enemy continued to avoid large unit contact but maintained steady pressure throughout the country, with his activity characterized by small-scale attacks in outlying areas and increased terrorism.

Communist Political Developments

The Viet Cong have retreated from their position taken last week when Madame Nguyen Tri Binh, the NLF's chief delegate at Paris, gave qualified support to General "Big" Minh's call for a popular referendum and hinted that Minh would be an acceptable substitute for President Thieu. Madame Binh, in an interview on 18 November, moved back in line with the Front's ten points by refusing to comment on Minh's proposal and declaring the Viet Cong will talk to any Vietnamese provided he opposes Thieu, and favors an unconditional U.S. withdrawal, a coalition government, and a neutral Vietnam. Minh would not qualify on the latter three conditions.

Enemy Infiltration


Detections of infiltration groups in the pipeline from North Vietnam fell during the week ending 15 November, but it appears now that the following week's input of some 4,000 personnel will be consistent with that seen since heavy infiltration resumed on 31 October. Total input for November now stands at about 8,500.

South Vietnamese Political Developments

President Thieu has reportedly ordered that legal charges of subversion be prepared against one of his most vocal critics, Tran Ngoc Lieng, Chairman of the opposition National Progressive Force. Although Lieng has been active in left-of-center politics and has urged a more accommodating stand toward the Communists, there is no solid evidence of a connection with the Viet Cong. Lieng has only a limited political following, but his arrest would probably have a disproportionate adverse reaction on world opinion. Thieu's action suggests he is becoming irritated over the rash of public and private criticism of his policies which broke out following his imposition of austerity taxes.

Not used

## I. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES (Combat Deaths)



Weekly AveragesCurrent

\*Preliminary


## II. INFILTRATION

Monthly Average of  
Infiltrators Arriving  
in SVN

1968 1969

Number of Infiltrators  
Entering Pipeline\*  
1 June to 17 Nov

25X1

III. ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTSWeekly Averages  
by Year:Weekly Averages  
by Month 1969:Current Weekly Totals  
for Week Ending:


Ground action intensified in the latter part of the week ending 15 November. Significant contacts were reported in I Corps in Quang Nam Province and near the DMZ, and near the Bu Prang CIDG Camp in southern II Corps. Regional Force units conducted particularly successful sweep operations near Hoi An in coastal Quang Nam. Seventeen helicopters were destroyed or heavily damaged when enemy sappers penetrated a US brigade base at Camp Radcliff (An Khe) in Binh Dinh Province on 15 November. It now appears that the enemy has moved full stride into his Winter/Spring Campaign.

IV. ENEMY THREAT VARIATIONS


|                | 30 Sep 1968        | 31 Mar 1969        | 30 Sep 1969        |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Main Force     |                    |                    |                    |
| NVA            | 120-140,000        | 120-130,000        | 90-100,000         |
| VC             | 50- 60,000         | 50- 65,000         | 40- 50,000         |
| Admin. Service | 60- 80,000         | 65- 80,000         | 60- 80,000         |
| Guerrilla      | 60-100,000         | 50-100,000         | 50- 80,000         |
| Total Threat   | <u>290-380,000</u> | <u>285-375,000</u> | <u>240-310,000</u> |

V. RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS

Weekly Average Enemy KIA by Year:



Enemy KIA by Week (1969):

VI. NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In a transparent effort to encourage dissent against the Thieu government, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the National Liberation Front's chief delegate at Paris, has given qualified support for General "Big" Minh's call for a popular referendum to determine the will of the people. Madame Binh chose to interpret Minh's proposal as an idea to measure the popularity of the Thieu government, interpretation which Minh has taken pains to deny. Madame Binh also declared the Communists would negotiate with Minh if he replaced Thieu as president, hinting that he would be an acceptable leader of a peace cabinet.

VII. SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The CIA chief in Saigon reports that the government has successfully weathered the political storm precipitated by its necessary, but ill-timed and clumsy, imposition of austerity measures in late October. The action created discontent among the public, the National Assemblymen, and the military, with some talk of a coup among the latter. Opposition politicians, particularly Senator Don and General "Big" Minh, moved to exploit the situation. The Presidential speech of 3 November probably more than any other factor, had a calming effect by easing fears of a U.S. sell-out. Tensions have since cooled, prices are falling, and the government is taking positive action to alleviate discontent. Nevertheless, there is a residue of ill-will, and the public has been left with the impression that some of the country's most influential figures are seeking an alternative to the Thieu regime.

VIII. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Not Used